Russia, like all UN member states, declared its commitment to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015. In the 2023 SDG Index ranking by SDSN, Russia held the 49th position out of 166 countries (based on 2022 data). Among the post-Soviet countries, excluding the Baltic states, Ukraine ranked higher (38th), and Belarus ranked even higher (34th).

Until February 24, 2022, Russia had not fully integrated the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and its objectives into national policies and development strategies for industries, regions, and cities (some elements were present in national projects). However, progress had been made toward achieving some goals by 2022, and there was hope that further implementation of the goals would gain momentum. Unfortunately, as seen from the latest report by SDCC, the onset of the war put an end to many initiatives and halted progress toward a sustainable future.

By 2020, Russia had made progress on SDG 2, in particular in achieving food security food self-sufficiency in many key categories, except milk and milk products, vegetables, gourds, fruits and berries, and table salt. In the Global Food Security Index, Russia, while remaining around the 40th place from 2014 to 2018, moved up to the 23rd place in 2021, and the prevalence of malnutrition among the population has remained at 2.5 % since 2004. In 2022, Russia dropped 20 places, falling to the 43rd place in the Global Food Security Index. The indicators that decreased the most include economic availability, namely the average price of food products, and physical availability.

Regarding the energy transition, a key focus of SDG 7, official statistics indicated that 100% of Russians had access to electricity, and the cost of electricity for households in Russia was several times lower than in European countries. In the first half of 2022, the majority of households paid no more than 6 rubles per kWh (0.07 €). In 2020, the share of coal and oil, the dirtiest forms of fossil fuels was about 35 % of Russia's total energy supply, while in the world it was more than 50 %.

In the second quarter of 2022, the construction of all the solar PV power plants planned under the programme to support renewable energy in the wholesale electricity market for the period up to 2024 was completed.

Formally, Russia has not yet abandoned the renewables support programmes, but their implementation will be difficult in the near future. This is due to the fact that because of the partial destruction of ties with Western countries, external interest in Russia's transition to renewable energy has significantly decreased, as well as the fact that the cost of Russian renewable energy projects is growing, while the conditions for their implementation (supplies of foreign components, international technologi cal cooperation, etc.) are deteriorating.Progress was also observed in SDG 9. Prior to the crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, this task was largely successful. The quality and availability of the Internet grew, new standards of high-speed data transmission for mobile phones were introduced. Passenger turnover growth was observed in key modes of transport: air (+34 % in 2019 against 2014) and rail (+3 %). In addition, passenger transportation by metro grew (+4 %). Russia's manufacturing industry has demonstrated continuous growth over the past six years. By the end of 2021, the GVA in manufacturing increased by 6.1 % compared to pre-COVID 2019; growth was observed in most manufacturing industries.

A direct consequence of the aggression against Ukraine was a noticeable decrease in the potential to achieve the objectives of this SDG. The rapid deterioration of the institutional environment, the restriction of capital flows, the deterioration of the protection of the rights of foreign investors led to a slowdown of many innovative projects and research, problems in the implementation of infrastructure projects, as well as difficulties in industry, which, among other things, is experiencing serious problems associated with the unavailability of foreign technologies.

Regarding responsible consumption, the focus of SDG 12, entire departments in companies began dealing with sustainable development, including responsible production and consumption practices. As of January 2021, there were 63 job openings related to sustainable development in Russia, and by January 2022, this number had risen to 241. The increase in job openings was due to global trends in ESG, requirements from foreign investors, and the opportunity to enter Western markets.In the autumn of 2021, the development of a standard for sustainable development in construction in the tourism industry began . The media launched special projects dedicated to responsible consumption. According to a VTsIOM survey in September 2021 more and more Russians practiced responsible consumption practices compared to 2019: 84 % tried to use energy-saving light bulbs (79 % in 2019), 76 % saved water (74 % in 2019), 45 % sorted waste (27 % in 2019), 41 % tried not to use personal vehicles, and 39 % disposed of hazardous waste responsibly (batteries, electronics, mercury lamps, etc.) compared to 23 % in 2019.

The work to achieve SDG 12 has slowed down significantly due to the departure of foreign companies that drove the changes, the departure of specialists, problems with the supply of equipment, and, in general, a change in focus, namely switching from develop-

ment mode to survival mode. However, not all initiatives have died. Some market players and individual specialists continue to do what they did in much worse conditions than a year earlier, trying to preserve their earlier achievements and move forward. Restrictions associated with a shortage of goods on the market and a drop in the disposable incomes of the population contribute to the development of services that help people spend resources more efficiently. But the incentives for such behaviour in the market are different than before. Such 'responsible production and consumption' are not by choice.

There were changes in the safety sector as well, as reflected in SDG 16. The annual number of registered violent deaths in Russia decreased significantly, from 23,170 cases in 2011 to nearly 11,000 cases in 2021. This reduction in violence is a positive development. However, it's important to note that this trend may not necessarily continue in the future.

The report's compilers were able to identify another unexpected fact, directly related to SDG 1, which is the poverty level in a region, rather than its ethnic composition, is associated with higher military casualties among individuals from that region. The lowest casualties per 100,000 population were recorded in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and oil-producing regions such as Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug and Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, while the highest casualties were in economically disadvantaged ethnic republics such as Tuva, Buryatia, and North Ossetia.

In Russia, consumption continues to decline, not due to a conscious change in lifestyle, but because many companies selling furniture and household appliances are scaling back. For example, the number of used smartphone sales on Avito (an Internet service for placing ads for goods and services from individuals and companies) increased by 33 % in the third quarter of 2022 compared to the same period last year. The average price of a gadget was 19,340 rubles, which is 17 % cheaper than the average retail price. People began to repair things more often. In March 2022, the demand for the repair of devices and electronics on Avito increased by 45 %.

As of 2021, 16 million people, or 11 % of the population, lived below the poverty line in Russia. wever, if the commonly accepted threshold of 60% of median income were applied in Russia, the poverty rate would be much higher than official data, at 36 million people, or 24.6% of the population, as of 2020.

When it comes to the results of 2022, on one hand, the Russian economy as a whole adapted to sanctions better than expected. As a result, according to Russian authorities' estimates, result, the reduction in GDP, according to the estimates of the Russian authorities, was less than 3 % in 2022.

From February, unemployment decreased by 0.5 percentage points and stood at 3.8% in October. This can be explained by mass emigration, the activation of the military-industrial complex, and the mobilisation of the Russian Armed Forces. All of this reduced the labor market supply, which, in turn, compels employers to avoid significant wage cuts.

Unemployment has decreased by 0.5 percentage points since February and amounted to 3.8 % in October. Here, apparently, mass emigration, the activation of the military-industrial complex, and the mobilisation of the Russian Armed Forces since September.

On the other hand, during the same period, income from energy resource exports sharply declined, while military spending increased. Russia still has reserves to finance the deficit, but in the long run, this could lead to cuts in social spending categories. Against the backdrop of an economic crisis and budget stagnation, budgetary issues will only exacerbate the situation of poverty and inequality in Russia.

If we talk about the overall eradication of poverty, Russian aggression significantly complicates the achievement of SDG 1, as the global losses due to the war in Ukraine over two years will amount to $2.8 trillion.

Russia and Ukraine are among the largest agricultural producers in the world. Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, their combined share in the world export markets of wheat and corn was 30 % and 20 %, respectively. In addition, the two countries exported about 80 % of sunflower seed products. Russia is also the world's leading exporter of nitrogen, potassium, and phosphorus fertilisers, the prices of which had already begun to rise since the end of 2020 due to higher energy prices and transportation costs in view of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Many countries are heavily dependent on Russian exports of food and fertilisers, including many of the least developed countries (LDCs) and low-income food-deficit countries (LIFDCs), which faced a threat to their food security, and in the case of some countries, a risk of hunger. The traditional importers of Russian grain are the countries of the Middle East, as well as the African countries, while fertilisers are purchased by some countries in Europe and Latin America.

The European Union is discussing the lifting of restrictions on the content of toxic cadmium in mineral fertilisers, which may lead to the spread of fertilisers with a high concentration of hazardous substances]. Several countries are pushing for Europe to postpone programmes for the transition to greener agriculture in order to increase agricultural production. One of the results of this pressure was that in March 2022, the European Commission postponed the publication of recommendations on sustainable agriculture and the environment, as well as Farm to Fork policy recommendations in legislative texts for an indefinite period.

In 2022, Russia dropped 20 places, falling to the 43rd place in the Global Food Security Index. The indicators that decreased the most include economic availability, namely the average price of food products; physical availability. Since April 2022, food spending has again taken the first place in the structure of consumption of the Russian population. The volume of agricultural production in Russia in January-September 2022 increased by 5.2 % compared to the same period in 2021 and amounted to 5.4 trillion rubles. Positive dynamics were observed in both crop production, where several agricultural crops produced record yields, and in livestock. At the same time, sunflower yields decreased by 2 %, and vegetables by 3.1 %. However, along with production growth, there was a sharp decrease in purchase prices and an increase in prices for the agricultural means of production, which negatively affected the farmers financial performance.

Even though in 2022 the demand for Russian products increased, including on the domestic market after foreign producers started leaving the country and Russian farmers had opportunities to pick up vacant niches, problems such as the dependence on foreign machinery, equipment, feed, seeds, and veterinary medicines have worsened. At the time of this report's release, some companies have left the Russian market or suspended their activities, some have stopped investments, and some continue to work. Agrokoncernas, Corteva Agriscience, and Kepenos Mills were among the first agricultural companies to stop their cooperation with Russia or operations with Russian counterparties. Many companies have stopped supplying products to Russia, reduced their range and investments (Coca Cola, Valio, Barilla, Hochland and others), or closed restaurants and cafes (McDonald's, Starbucks and others). A full list of companies and their current status can be found on the #LeaveRussia website.

The mobilisation has also affected the development of the agricultural sector, which led to a shortage of machine operators and truck drivers at individual agricultural enterprises and farms.

Relatively reliable estimates of confirmed casualties of Russia presented in the investigations of Mediazona and published by the BBC give a figure in the range of 11,500 to 23,000 people for the beginning of 2023. These numbers are considered to be the lower limit of casualties (and will undoubtedly grow by the time the report is published). The figures obtained are incomparable with the losses from COVID-19 (by February 2022, excess mortality resulting from the pandemic in Russia amounted to more than 750 per 100,000 people, in absolute figures, losses at the end of 2021 exceeded 1 million people) or, for example, with Armenia's losses in the 2020 Karabakh war, 0.1 % of the country's population, which, together with excess mortality from COVID-19, led to a collapse in the life expectancy of men by 4.7 years.

Due to the outbreak of hostilities against Ukraine, the risk arose that long-term cooperation will be stopped and international ties on many issues in the field of healthcare will be severed. The activities of the World Health Organization (WHO) in Russia can be cited as an example. In May 2022, the WHO Regional Committee for Europe already adopted a resolution proposing to explore the possibility of transferring the Moscow office for combating non-communicable diseases outside of Russia. The Regional Support Team of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), also previously located in Moscow, was relocated to Bonn (Germany).

Currently, not everyone can work in education. The new law on foreign agents of December 1, 2022 prohibits persons with this status from carrying out educational activities with minors, as well as pedagogical activities in state and municipal educational organisations. Teachers and academics can be mobilised. School teachers, university professors and Doctors and Candidates of Sciences (doctoral level degrees in Russia) did not have their mobilisation postponed, despite numerous requests from the public.

At the beginning of the academic year 2022/2023, 'Conversations about important things' were introduced in schools. These are weekly additional class hours aimed at 'developing patriotism' and civic education. In the next academic year, a compulsory subject will be introduced into schools — initial military training. Its objective is 'to systematically prepare the citizens for a possible confrontation with an enemy.

In the first days of the invasion, more than 1,200 teachers, as well as 180 academics and science journalists signed letters condemning the Russian aggression. There is another position expressed within the educational community about the situation. On the part of universities, it comes from the highest level: in early March, 184 university rectors signed a letter in support of military activities]. It is important to note that it had not been signed by rectors of all universities.

In response to Russia's aggression, the OECD suspended Russia's participation in a number of monitoring programmes: PISA (evaluating general education), TALIS (evaluating the level of teacher training), and PIAAC (evaluating adult competencies). A Russian assessment is planned using the PISA testing model, but independent control and analysis of international testing are unlikely to be provided.

In May, the State Duma began the process of withdrawing from the Bologna system. Universities are offered a return to the specialist degree system or a switch to the '2+2+2' system, in which students can change their specialty after two years of study. The question of abolishing the Unified State Exam was raised.

Coursera and edX have suspended access to materials from Russian universities. Scopus and Web of Science have closed access to databases of articles for Russian academics.

In December 2022, the National Strategy for Women for 2023-2030 was approved. Measures to combat violence against women have been curtailed.

The obvious decrease in the number of victims since 2017 is caused only by the fact that a law was adopted in Russia, which means that beatings in the family are no longer considered a criminal offence if the victim complains to the police for the first time.

Since March 16, 2022, the Russian Federation has been excluded from the Council of Europe, which led to Russia's withdrawal from the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).

Women from Ukraine, often with young children, are a group that is potentially vulnerable to various types of abuse. They often can't get an official job, have difficulties with enrolling children in kindergartens and are left without the support of husbands and other relatives. One of the phenomena of this time was numerous announcements from men who were ready to provide housing to women in exchange for housework and (or) sex.

One of the most reputable studies on gender equality in the world, the Global Gender Gap Report of the World Economic Forum, did not include the Russan Federation in 2022. In April 2022, the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation revoked the registration of Russia in 13 international organisations, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, all German political foundations and the German Research Foundation.

If an organisation is deemed undesirable, its activities on Russian territory are fully prohibited; individuals and legal entities are prohibited from participating in the activities of undesirable organisations, including the distribution of their materials. Administrative and criminal liability is established for the violation of these prohibitions.

The direct impact of the hostilities that began on February 24, 2022, concerns contamination from ammunition explosions, destruction of storage facilities with leaks of dangerous substances, the burning of objects with toxic emissions, and leaving dead bodies in natural areas.

Military actions lead to pollution of transboundary waters in the basin of the Siversky Donets river flowing in both Russia and Ukraine and to pollution of the Black Sea through rivers. The agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the joint use and protection of transboundary waters, signed in Kyiv in 1992, lost its meaning. In December 2022, Ukraine withdrew from the agreement. It is impossible to predict how long it may take to resume the dialogue on the river basins common to Ukraine, Russia and Belarus.

After the start of the Russian invasion, the European Union suspended Russia's cross-border cooperation programmes with Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, including projects on monitoring water bodies, developing basin management, and introducing new technologies to reduce the pollution of water bodies common to Russia and the EU.

By the decision of HELCOM (Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission), Russia's participation in the work of the Commission was suspended. This is the only common international instrument for coordinated actions to protect the waters of the Baltic basin, common to Russia and EU countries, which identifies the main challenges and develops recommendations for the improvement of rivers and the entire Baltic Sea.

The beginning of Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2022 also forced the EU to urgently begin abandoning Russian fossil fuels and accelerate its own energy transition. The embargo on Russian coal has been imposed since August 10, 2022, on seaborne Russian crude oil (most of the purchases) since December 5, 2022, and on Russian petroleum products since February 5, 2023. The gas embargo has not yet been imposed, but Russia has actually imposed sanctions on its gas exports to the EU itself, blackmailing Europe by reducing supplies. In January 2023, the volume of Russian gas exports to the EU reached 15 % of the level of January 2021. The reorientation of the fuel intended for Europe to the east is complicated by the lack of the necessary transport capacity in this direction, as well as the restrictions of the EU and the G7 on the transportation of Russian oil. In addition, eastern countries, in particular China and India, are ready to buy Russian energy resources only at significant discounts. Also in March 2022, the EU adopted the RePowerEU plan, one of the goals of which is to achieve 45 % of renewable resources in the electric power industry by 2030 instead of 40 % as previously planned. Thus, renewable energy in the EU will develop even faster, and relations with Russia in the field of traditional energy will never return to their previous level.

A number of foreign companies have expressed a desire to leave or have already left the Russian market. One of the three largest investors in Russian wind energy, the Italian company Enel, refused to build a wind farm in Stavropol Krai and sold its Russian generating assets. The Finnish company Fortum, another major investor in the Russian wind energy industry, has mothballed several unfinished wind farms and abandoned some of the new wind power projects that were selected before 2022. Among other things, Fortum's decisions were driven by the withdrawal from the Russian market of its technological partner, the Danish company Vestas, which produced turbine blades in Russia. Earlier, Fortum itself also announced plans to leave the Russian market, but has not yet implemented them.

Foreign investments and technologies helped to develop the vast majority of industries, including the largest ones: mining, manufacturing, and wholesale and retail trade. Investments (gross fixed capital formation) accounted for a fifth of the country's GDP in 2021. Russian companies could issue their debt on international financial markets and sell business shares to foreigners, while the state entered international markets with large-scale loan programs. Sanctions have blocked most of these opportunities.

Until 2022, international organizations, such as the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), assessed Russia's level of innovation development as corresponding to its economy. The main outcome of 2022 was the closure of access to technologies and the potential for their development. This is manifested in restrictions on technological (investment) imports, limitations on the activities of Western companies on Russian territory, the closure of access to the global capital market, and the threat of secondary sanctions for countries that continue to collaborate in the technological sphere.

The most striking example is the inability to maintain the aircraft fleet consisting mainly of foreign aircraft, due to a lack of spare parts, which forces airlines to disassemble part of another aircraft to get them.

Because of this and also because Russian airlines were unable to carry out air transportation to many key destinations, from March to November 2022 there was a decrease in air passenger turnover by 13 % compared to the same period in 2021, although railway passenger turnover increased by 19 %.

A sharp decline in cargo turnover was avoided due to the delayed effects of the main sanctions against oil and petroleum products, which came into force in early December 2022 and early February 2023 respectively. Military spending, although it supports some manufacturing industries such as metallurgy, cannot compensate for the loss of income from reduced export opportunities. The closure of the European market also negatively affects other industries, for example forestry, where the decline in the production of certain types of products ranges from 9 % to 28 %, according to data for 11 months of 2022.

The most striking example is the automotive industry where the production of passenger cars in January to November 2022 fell by 67%. Brands such as Renault, Volvo Group, Mercedes-Benz, BMW, Hyundai, and Ford have left and closed or stopped local production.

Infrastructure development in Russia often happened due to the import of Western technologies. For example, Russian Railways, in cooperation with the German company Siemens, not only created new high-speed routes with modern comfortable trains but also localised the production and repair of some of them on the territory of the country. Today, cooperation in this area has been completely stopped.

Many Russian companies, seeking to attract foreign investors, implemented ESG standards and declared their participation in achieving the UN SDGs. In the absence of foreign investor interest in equity financing of Russian companies, it is possible that big Russian corporations will refuse to further commit to these goals.

After the announcement of partial mobilisation in September, about 700,000 citizens left Russia. They mostly fled to Georgia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, Serbia, and Montenegro – mainly to the countries with which Russia has a visa-free regime. Migrants who had managed to obtain Russian citizenship also started going back to their home countries. Emigration came as a shock to Russian citizens: according to the Levada Centre (recognised as a foreign agent in the Russian Federation), two-thirds of Russians have never left the country.

In September, the State Duma adopted a law on the simplified procedure to obtain citizenship for foreigners who have signed a contract to serve in the army. The authorities began to urge migrants to participate in hostilities against Ukraine. The mayor of Moscow announced the opening of a representative office of the Ministry of Defence in the Sakharovo migration centre; citizens of CSTO countries were recruited in Moscow. In October, two citizens of Tajikistan committed a shooting at a military training ground in the Belgorod region.

According to the law, the indigenous people of Russia have the right to replace military service with an alternative civilian one. However, indigenous people have been forcibly mobilised for war with Ukraine. In Sakha, draft letters came to three Yukaghirs, even though there are only a little more than 1,500 of them left. Mobilisation could affect all settlements where indigenous peoples live.

In 2022, the authorities liquidated the Russian representative office of Human Rights Watch and 14 offices of other foreign NGOs.

Until February 24, 2022, Russia was unable to fully integrate SDG 11 and its goals into national policies and urban development strategies (although some elements were present in national projects). The budget cuts for 2023-2025 affected the state program for the development of the transportation system (-389 billion rubles in 2023-25) and the federal project for solid municipal waste management (-871,473.2 thousand rubles annually in 2023-25). After the start of Russian aggression against Ukraine, populated areas in border zones were repeatedly affected by military actions.

According to a VTsIOM survey in September 2021, more and more Russians practiced responsible consumption practices compared to 2019: 84 % tried to use energy-saving light bulbs (79 % in 2019), 76 % saved water (74 % in 2019), 45 % sorted waste (27 % in 2019), 41 % tried not to use personal vehicles, and 39 % disposed of hazardous waste responsibly (batteries, electronics, mercury lamps, etc.) compared to 23 % in 2019.

The withdrawal of foreign companies from the Russian market and the sanctions of foreign states led to large-scale changes in the country's economy, which, of course, influenced Russia's progress towards achieving SDG 12. Russia temporarily allowed cars to be produced with standards from Euro-0 to Euro-5, which correspond to 1988 emission norms.

Due to the sanctions, Russia has faced a shortage of mineral raw materials, for example a shortage of lithium needed for batteries and the development of alternative energy.

The departure of foreign companies and the disruption of supply chains have led to a shortage of certain goods and a change in consumer behaviour. In the spring, retail faced a shortage of receipt paper], which prompted the Federal Tax Service to urgently write a letter about the possibility of issuing electronic receipts instead of paper ones. Many retailers have switched to an electronic receipt system. Later, the Ministry of Industry and Trade stated that the shortage of receipt paper was over, but the practice of issuing electronic receipts instead of paper ones remained with some retailers.

A year earlier, according to the results of surveys], two-thirds of Russians (64 %) stated that they would prefer a more expensive product to a cheaper one if the expensive one was safer for the environment. In 2022, a third of Russians admitted that this year they began to cut back, even on food. The decline in household incomes contributes to the development of the secondary use market.

Foreign organisations that had previously supported environmental projects left Russia. For example, the Russian market lost IKEA, which in many ways was a leading example in terms of sustainable development projects. Several organisations have been closed by the Russian authorities or deemed undesirable. For example, the Heinrich Böll Foundation was recognised as an undesirable organisation, while the Friedrich Ebert Foundation branch was closed by order of the Russian authorities.

In 2021, on the eve of COP26 in Glasgow, Russia announced its goal to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. At the same time, the country refused to strengthen its nationally determined contributions within the Paris Agreement. Actively participating in the negotiation processes in recent years, Russia has continued to insist that international cooperation in the fight against climate change should not be politicised.

After February 24, Russia lost a significant portion of its export markets due to sanctions. Enterprises had to seek new trading partners. This, combined with the departure of many international companies from the country, means that the Russian industry has lost its main motivation for decarbonization - the European Union's cross-border carbon tax.

Russia does not report on direct and indirect emissions as a result of its military actions against Ukraine. However, the calculations of an international group of experts for the first seven months of the invasion showed that 86.2 % of emissions from military operations were formed due to the burning of fossil fuels, including fires at enterprise and oil storage facilities. Fossil fuels are used to move military and civilian vehicles used during combat operations. The total amount of emissions from military clashes amounted to about 9 million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent.

Russia's military aggression in Ukraine has affected the global energy and food systems, provoking economic, energy, and food crises. The need for urgent decarbonisation and more energy independence from Russia has become acute among the EU countries. Despite the temporary growth of energy generated from fossil fuels in the countries of the European Union, the goals for the development of renewable energy are still ambitious. Against this background, the cooperation of Western countries with Russia in the field of energy and technoogy has been significantly reduced.

The year 2022 will be remembered for an abnormally high number of mass deaths of marine mammals, the exact causes of which are not fully established. These include the deaths of 50-100 thousand dolphins in the Black Sea (direct and indirect consequences of military actions), the deaths of 3 thousand Caspian seals in the Caspian Sea (due to disease or suffocation from natural gas emissions near its extraction sites), the deaths of polar bears due to poor ice conditions (low ice coverage), and more.

The consequences of armed conflict in the form of international sanctions, the closure of international scientific programs and funding, reductions in domestic scientific programs, as well as challenges in organizing and conducting monitoring, such as inadequate funding and a shortage of young professional personnel, among other factors, make achieving SDG 14 by 2030 extremely problematic.

Trends that have been exacerbated in previous years include the deliberate weakening of environmental and natural resource legislation and the actual destruction of the state's nature conservation system, a significant reduction in the ability of parliament, law enforcement, and judicial bodies to fulfill nature conservation tasks.

The number of unacceptable actions in relation to nature reserves and national parks, including those by law enforcement agencies and businesses (Wrangel Island, Kronotsky, Samarskaya Luka, Losiny Ostrov, Kostomuksha) has significantly increased, as well as the intensity of destructive 'improvement' of urban protected areas. An expressive manifestation of the environmental arbitrariness of the state is the transformation of the Komandorsky Reserve into a national park. This decision was made against the wishes of the population and the position of local authorities, and despite diverse scientific justifications for the preservation of the reserve.

The area covered by wildfires in forest reserves amounted to slightly more than 9 million hectares in 2022, which is about half as much as in 2021. Funding for fighting fires has more than doubled to 14.2 billion rubles. However, 10 times more is needed to effectively fight fires. The system of prevention and control of wildfires still does not correspond to their scale.

In 2022, there was a trend toward discrediting environmental NGOs, with many of them being labeled as foreign agents, leading to their closure.

At the end of 2022, the number of violent crimes in three main categories and illegal weapons trafficking did not show a change in the trend from previous years. Also at least 250,000 Russian servicemen have already taken part in the hostilities, a considerable part of whom participated in war crimes against the civilian population and/ or took part in occupation activities. In addition, the Russian government itself is purposefully engaged in dehumanising and inciting hatred against both Ukrainians themselves and those Russians who oppose the war and/ or express sympathy for the victims of Russian aggression.

At the same time, Russia is violating its international obligations on nuclear security and non-proliferation by seizing the Zaporizhzhia NPP and refusing not only to return it to Ukraine's control but also to form a demilitarised zone around it.

Moreover, despite occasional exchanges of prisoners of war, Russia is clearly violating the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols to them, especially with regard to the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilians. In particular, the refusal of the Russian side to allow the Red Cross mission to the site of the mass murder of Ukrainian prisoners of war in Olenivka, Donetsk region, demonstrates the Kremlin's disregard for even the basic international legal foundations that developed in the second half of the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries.

At the same time, Russia is still trying to maintain its membership in Interpol, which gives it the opportunity to engage in the international search for criminals. However, Russia's systematic abuse of this opportunity for political purposes casts doubt on its prospects as a responsible member of this international organisation.

In 2022, around 250,000 websites were blocked without a court order, including many websites of human rights organizations and independent media outlets that publish critical information about Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Hundreds of organizations and individuals have been declared foreign agents, and dozens have been declared undesirable.

As of December 1, 2022, a law came into effect requiring taxi services to provide the Federal Security Service (FSB) with access to their databases and information systems, allowing the FSB to access the personal data of citizens without a court order.

On March 4, the State Duma quickly passed amendments to the Administrative Offenses Code and the Criminal Code, known as the "laws on military censorship." Liability was introduced for "discrediting" the Russian armed forces, calling for the prevention of their use, and imposing sanctions on Russian citizens and legal entities. Colleagues from Roskomsvoboda calculated that in 2022, 9,300 Internet resources fell under military censorship and were blocked. Facebook was among the first to be blocked on March 4, and Meta, the owner of Facebook and Instagram, was declared an "extremist organization" on March 21, and its activities in Russia were banned. The words "war" and, in fact, "peace" were placed under prohibition. Not surprisingly, in 2022, Russia fell to 155th place (out of 180) in the annual World Press Freedom Index compiled by Reporters Without Borders.

On the other hand, the government allowed customers subject to foreign sanctions not to disclose information about transactions in the Unified Information System for Procurement (zakupki.gov.ru). VTB announced the introduction of transfers with banks in Iran, which is on the FATF blacklist for the absence of an anti-terrorism financing system. Being on the FATF blacklist, or even the gray list, significantly complicates legal transactions with Russian banks. Several countries, including the United States, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and EU member states, suspended the automatic exchange of tax and banking information with Russia. This leads to an increase in corruption risks.

In the report of the Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN), published in 2022, Russia's achievement of SDG 17 was estimated at 50 to 75 % (100 % means achieving the goal).

One of the key targets of SDG 17 is the provision of official development assistance (ODA). The amount of ODA provided by Russia in 2019 amounted to $1,227 million,, which exceeds that of more than half of the member countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), including Finland, New Zealand and Portugal.

One of the main consequences of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine from the perspective of SDG 17 is the termination or significant reduction of cooperation with international organisations that play an important role in the formation of a global partnership for sustainable development.

The reaction of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) was the harshest. Already on February 24, the OECD Council condemned the large-scale aggression against Ukraine and announced a reconsideration of all cooperation with Russia. The next day, it was announced that the process of Russia's accession to the OECD, postponed in 2014, was formally terminated, the office in Moscow would be closed, all the invitations of Russian representatives to ministerial events would be stopped, and any projects funded by Russia were suspended. On March 8, the suspension of Russia's participation in all OECD bodies was announced. On March 2, the World Bank issued a statement that as a result of the invasion of Ukraine, it would immediately stop all its programmes in Russia and Belarus.